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Recent studies find that individuals' social norms, as evidenced by their opinions and behavior can be transmitted from one generation to the next within the same cultural setting. Most relevant to our study, there is evidence of inter-generational transmission of social trust (Algan and Cahuc 2010 , Bjørnskov 2012 , Dohmen et al 2012 , Guiso et al 2006 , Rainer and Siedler 2009 , Rice and Feldman 1997 . The reasons for the stability are hypothesized to be based on parental socialization during childhood. For example, beliefs in the trustworthiness of strangers are largely formed in early childhood and remain relatively stable over the life course, at least in the absence of major negative shocks (Dohmen et al 2012 , Katz and Rotter 1969 , Tabellini 2008 . Studies also find that the current environment plays an important role in shaping an individual's social norms. For example, Dinesen (2012a) and Nannestad et al (2014) find that the institutions in destination-country rather than culture matter for immigrant social trust. Studies on the determinants of social trust confirm the importance of the social characteristics of the communities in which an individual is currently living (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002 , Bjørnskov 2007 , Glaeser et al 2000 , Helliwell and Wang 2011 , Kosfeld et al 2005 .
There is thus theory and evidence supporting two quite different perspectives on the sources of social norms. These are sometimes summarized by two main perspectives: cultural versus experiential. The cultural perspective stresses that social norms are a durable trait transmitted from one generation to the next through parenting activities and other aspects of early socialization, whereas the experiential perspective emphasizes that such norms are mainly based on experience in the environment in which one lives. Analyzing the attitudes of immigrants is an effective way to examine the relative importance of the two perspectives, as the experiential perspective predicts that immigrants' attitudes will be highly affected by their current surroundings in the destination country, while the cultural perspective predicts that immigrants' social norms will be highly correlated with those prevalent in their birth countries 1 . In this paper we examine the global footprints of two important social norms, i.e. social trust 2 and generosity 3 to show the relative importance of culture and experience in each case.
It has long been held that social trust is essential to the success of group ventures, and especially to democratic governance. The important roles of social trust in the economy and society are shown by the empirical linkages between social trust and a variety of outcomes ranging from economic growth Putnam 1995, Fukuyama 1995, 1 Dinesen (2011a) shows that general trust refers to the same phenomenon for both natives and immigrants and thus we can safely compare levels, causes and consequences of trust for the two groups. 2 What we refer to in this paper as social trust is sometimes alternatively described as general trust, generalized trust, or interpersonal trust. 3 It can be alternatively called norms of giving or prosocial conduct in this paper, but it is not necessary to be the same as altruism since we do not differentiate whether the generosity is driven by altruism or self-interests. More discussion of these issues can be found in Kolm (2006) . Knack and Keefer 1997 , Tabellini 2010 , Algan and Cahuc 2010 , 2013 , Guiso et al 2006 , government efficiency (La Porta et al 1997 , Bjørnskov 2003 , 2010 , health outcomes (Kawachi et al, eds.2008) , and happiness (Helliwell and Putnam 2004 , Bjørnskov 2008 , Chang 2009 , Helliwell and Wang 2011 to deaths from traffic fatalities and suicides Wang 2011, Nagler 2013) . In those studies, social trust is typically measured by survey answers to the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" This and similar questions have been widely asked in recent decades in the World Value Surveys/European Value Surveys (WVS/EVS), various national social and Barometer surveys, and some waves of the Gallup World Poll to gauge the levels of social trust. Within and across nations, answers to the social trust question have been shown to be reliable estimates of trustworthiness, as measured by their strong positive correlation, at the national level, with the frequency with which money-bearing wallets were returned to their owners when dropped in major cities in 14 different countries (Knack 2001) .
Social trust has been found to be transmitted from one generation to the next in many countries. The cultural perspective, wherein trust is part of an enduring political culture, implies that the trust footprint of migration would be long-lasting, as suggested in Almond and Verba (1963) , Putnam (1993) and Uslaner (2002) . Algan and Cahuc (2010) , Bjørnskov (2012) , Guiso et al (2006) , Rice and Feldman (1997) , and Uslaner (2008) all find a strong correlation between the social trust of Americans and national averages of answers to the same questions in their ancestral countries. Remarkably, Rice and Feldman (1997) find the correlations to be just as high for those whose grand-parents, rather than parents, were born in the ancestral country. Heineck and Süssmuth (2013) and Rainer and Siedler (2009) both find that East Germans have a persistent level of low social trust even after 20 years of reunification. A study on immigrants to Israel finds that those from the United States were more trusting of others than were those coming from Russia (Gitelman 1982) .
To examine the relative importance of cultural and experiential impacts, Uslaner (2008) uses individual-level US General Social Survey evidence to separate the effects of inherited trust from the effects of living among others from high-trust backgrounds. He finds some evidence for both, but concludes that the effects of inherited trust are greater than those of the current context of social trust. Dinesen (2013) , by exploiting individuallevel data for migrants to a number of European destination countries, finds support for both cultural and experiential perspectives, as the migrants in his sample make trust assessments that reflect trust in their countries of origin and lack of corruption in the destination country. Looking at differences between migrants coming from Western and non-Western countries, he finds similar effects for source-country trust, but differing effects of corruption levels in the destination country, with immigrants from Western 3 countries showing a much larger effect from lack of corruption in the destination country. Dinesen (2012b) finds similar results. A study of the source-country trust footprint of individual Canadian immigrants from many countries revealed a significant impact from source-country trust, but found the footprint to be smaller and less significant for those whose families had lived longer in Canada (Soroka et al 2006) . Similarly, Dinesen and Hooghe (2010) find that immigrants to Western Europe adapt more to local trust levels in the second generation than they do in the first generation after immigration. Dinesen (2012a) argues that experience is more important than culture by examining the immigrants from three low-trust countries of origin (Turkey, Poland, and Italy) to hightrust countries in Northern Europe. He finds that the destination-country context has a large impact on social trust of immigrants, who show significantly higher levels of social trust than comparable respondents in their country of origin. Similarly, Nannestad et al (2014) find that the institutions in destination countries rather than culture matter for social trust by analysing immigrants from several non-western countries to Denmark.
Most previous studies of the footprint of imported trust have relied to migrants to a single country, with some more recent use of a number of European countries as alternative destinations. Those studies are subject to the problem of lack of generality. To be of broader relevance, judgments about the relative importance of imported trust need to be assessed using data drawn from a fuller range of source and destination countries.
Generosity, like social trust, varies among communities and nations, and has positive consequences for the communities where it prevails. Indeed prosocial behaviour has been argued to be an essential underpinning for the large-scale social cooperation that permitted early human groups to thrive (Wilson 1975) . Individuals involved in prosocial conduct tend to be happier (Aknin et al 2011 , Aknin et al 2012 , Aknin et al 2013 , Dunn et al 2008 . International differences in generosity (as measured by the donation question in the Gallup World Poll) are large, and have been found to be pervasively linked, both within and among societies, to average differences in subjective well-being (Aknin et al 2013, Helliwell and Wang 2013) .
Studies highlight the importance of social and contextual influences in cultivating generosity, especially during early adolescence, e.g. parental impacts (de Guzman and Carlo 2004, Eisenberg et al 2006) , the role of peer groups (Carlo et al 1999 , de Guzman and Carlo 2004 , Eisenberg et al 2006 , Krupka and Weber 2009 , Siu et al 2006 , and the impacts of other environmental sources (Carlo et al 2011 , Eisenberg et al 2006 , Grusec et al 2002 . Ottoni-Wilhelm and Zhang (2011) argues that parents will intentionally transmit generosity to their children since they place importance on the child's identity including generosity.
Since generosity is an important social norm (Leeds 1963 , Siu et al 2006 , and is likely to be learned in youth (Carlo et al 1999 , Carlo et al 2011 , Ottoni-Wilhelm and Zhang 2011 and possibly relearned when times change or people migrate to a new and different society, we might expect to find migration footprint effects for generosity, just as has been done for social trust. But would the footprint be likely to be higher or lower in the case of generosity? In contrast to the large number of studies on the footprint effects of social trust, there is no corresponding research base for generosity. Our research aims to partially fill this gap.
We include institutional trust in our study to provide a possible contrast to the social norms that are the main focus of our paper. We expect social norms to have larger footprints than those associated with judgments about institutions that are expected to differ from one country to the next. If we find that immigrants and the native born share the same judgments about the quality of institutions in the destination country, then we can thereby argue with greater conviction that the footprints of social norms like social trust and generosity are not simply due to slow absorption of the current environment, since rapid adjustment will have already been witnessed for the case of local and national institutions.
Previous research on institutional trust has tended to show the importance of the local context as well as rapid adjustment to new circumstances, both types of result being in accordance with our expectations. Institutional trust is indeed important, both by providing support for government actions (Chanley et al 2000) , and as a source of happiness (Bartolini et al 2013 , Helliwell and Huang 2008 , Helliwell and Wang 2011 . In terms of its determinants, studies have shown the importance of the current social and economic contexts: institutional trust is strongly affected by institutional and economic performance (Zmerli and Hooghe 2011). Chanley et al (2000) find that political scandals, increasing public concerns about crime rates, and negative perceptions of economic conditions lead to declining trust in U.S. government. Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) find that countries having significantly increasing unemployment rates tend to have falling trust in national governments. Some other studies find that political corruption has a strong negative impact on institutional trust (Chang and Chu 2006, Morris and Klesner 2010) .
There is some evidence that institutional trust judgments respond quickly to the current environment, and hence that, in this case, experience trumps culture. Mishler and Rose (2001) find that confidence in institutions is strongly affected by institutional performance and economic performance in post-communist societies, but find little support for cultural impact. Heineck and Süssmuth (2013) and Rainer and Siedler (2009) both find strong convergence of institutional trust in West and East Germany after reunification.
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Current evidence seems to support that institutional trust differs significantly from social norms in ways that make it less likely to have a significant carry-over from conditions in the immigrant's country of birth. Whether these patterns hold for the global sample is not yet known. Thus there is room for using global samples to test footprint effects for institutional trust and to compare them with those for social trust and generosity This paper tests the relative importance of culture versus experience by examining the immigration footprints for social trust, for generosity and for confidence in specific national institutions making use of a fully global sample involving migrants to more than 130 countries. These data from the Gallup World Poll enable us to establish the generality of footprint effects for two social norms, and to see whether footprint effects are, as expected, much smaller or non-existent for measures of institutional trust.
Our results show that the effect of source country social trust is strongly significant, with a size about one-third as large as that from trust levels in the destination countries where the migrant now lives. Moreover, migrants from low-trust environments are especially affected by the low trust in their country of origin even after migration, while migrants from high-trust environments are less likely to import the high trust of their country of origin to their current country of residence. We also show that, holding constant the effects of imported trust, immigrants and the native-born have similar levels of social trust. We find similar, but smaller, footprint effects for generosity. In contrast to our social trust and generosity results, and consistent with our expectations, we find no footprint effects for confidence in domestic institutions.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. We first describe our data and estimation methods in Section 2, and then present our results. First we shall present the results for social trust in Section 3, and then continue with our comparable results for generosity in Section 4. In section 5 we contrast our footprint results for social trust and generosity with our results for confidence in domestic institutions. We then summarize our conclusions in section 6.
Data and Methods
The data we use are from seven waves of the Gallup World Poll conducted in 2005-2012 in 160 countries. It is a repeated cross-sectional data set containing 941,201 observations. For the key variable social trust, we unfortunately have a smaller sample, about 200,000 observations. It is mainly surveyed in 2009-2010, with only a few countries in 2011-2012. The survey question is "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have to be careful in dealing with people?" We also examine the footprint effect of generosity and institutional trust (several variables regarding the perception of government and society, such as confidence in judicial system and courts, 6 confidence in police, confidence in national government, perceived corruption in government, perceived corruption in business, whether respondents trust their assets and property to be safe at all times if starting a business, whether respondents trust the government to allow their business make a lot of money if starting a business). The responses to those questions are all binary with values 0 or 1. The set of control variables includes age, gender, marital status, educational attainment, the natural logarithm of net household income, social support, freedom to make life choices, and generosity (the latter for the trust equations only). Social support is a binary response to "If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not?" Generosity is measured by the estimated frequency of donations to charity during the previous 30 days (adjusted for differences in household income). Freedom to make life choices is a binary response to the question "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what to do with your life?" The summary statistics for immigrants are shown in Since we also want to see whether immigrants have higher or lower social trust compared to non-immigrants, we run regressions for all respondents. The summary statistics of social trust and those independent variables for both immigrants and non-immigrants are presented in Table 2 . To examine the footprint effects of social trust and to compare trust levels of immigrants and non-immigrants, we estimate the following equation:
The dependent variable Y ij is the individual level of social trust of respondent i in country j. RT j is the average social trust in the country where the respondent currently lives. ST i is the average social trust in the respondent's birth country. For non-immigrants, the values in their birth countries are the same as in their countries of current residence. IM ij is a dummy variable for immigrants. The vector X ij has all other personal and demographic information including age, age squared, gender, marital status, educational attainment, the natural logarithm of net household income, social support, generosity, and freedom to make life choices. u ij is the error term.
We then confirm the footprint effect of social trust in the regressions for immigrants only. We also investigate the footprint effect of generosity and a set of variables measuring trust in institutions, such as confidence in judicial system and courts, confidence in police, confidence in national government, perceived corruption in government, perceived corruption in business, whether respondents trust their assets and property to be 8 safe at all times if starting a business, whether respondents trust the government to allow their business make a lot of money if starting a business, for immigrants only. The equation we estimate for this purpose is:
The dependent variable Y ij is the individual level of trust measure of immigrant i in country j. RT j is the average trust in the country the respondent currently lives in. ST i is the average trust in the source country for those immigrants. The vector X ij has the same meaning as in Equation (1) except that in this case the sample only includes immigrants. e ij is the error term. Table 3 shows our OLS regression results using both immigrant and non-immigrant respondents following Equation (1) 4 . In column (1) we include variables for age, gender, marital status, and education, and in column (2) we include additional covariates such as log income, social support, generosity, and freedom to make life choices. The two columns give similar results, as both show that immigrants' judgements about how much other people can, in general, be trusted are significantly correlated with trust levels in their birth countries and with that in the countries where they now live 5 . The coefficients on imported trust are just under one-third as large as for trust in the country of origin 6 .
The Footprint of Social Trust: Culture and Experience Both Matter
The large coefficient on trust in the country of residence implies, as found by Voicu (2012) with European data, that migrants from a given country are more likely to have high levels of social trust if they have moved to a higher trust environment. But we shall show later that the footprint effect is larger for those moving from a lower to a higher trust environment than vice versa.
By including all respondents, rather than just immigrants, in our sample, we can see whether, on average, immigrants have either greater or less social trust than do those living in their countries of birth. Tables 1 and 2 show that the average levels of social trust are similar for the global sample of immigrants (0.230) as for the entire group of respondents (0.238). In column (1) of Table 3 the negative migrant coefficient shows that 9 when we account for individual demography migrants are slightly less trusting than the native-born. However, the other columns show that this effect becomes smaller and insignificant when we allow for other determinants of social trust, or split the sample between OECD and non-OECD countries of residence 7 . There is a research literature showing that people are far more likely to trust others when they have lived longer in their communities Wang 2011, Putnam 2007 ), and will be less trusting where people from differing backgrounds have not had long to make the repeated personal connections that support interpersonal trust. Thus immigrants might, on average, have lower levels of social trust, since they have had less long to plant roots in their communities (de Vroome et al 2013) . Soroka et al (2006, Table 5.3) found that immigrants to Canada had significantly lower social trust than other Canadians, even after adjusting for the quality of their social networks, education, and other key variables, but that this effect was entirely eliminated if account was taken of the footprint effect of the levels (on average lower) social trust in their birth countries. Putnam (2007) found that social trust is lower in communities with high percentages of immigrants. He was not able to adjust for immigrant footprint effects, so it is not easy to tell how much of this effect is due to recent US immigrants coming from countries with lower average levels of social trust, as was found for Canada. Hooghe et al (2009 , Table 1 ) find social trust to be lower among immigrants than non-immigrants in Europe; it is not possible to tell whether and how much this result is due to an unmeasured footprint effect. Our global data involves more symmetric migration among countries of differing trust levels, so that immigrant and other respondents have the same average levels of social trust whether or not we take account of the levels of social trust in their countries of birth.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 split the sample between OECD and other countries. In both cases we use the form of model (1) to conserve degrees of freedom, since model (2) has similar results to model (1) but a significantly smaller sample size. Immigrant shares are higher in the OECD than in non-OECD country samples (8.2% vs. 4.6%), and the footprint effects of imported trust are estimated to be more than twice as high. Moreover, the footprint effects in non-OECD countries are only significant at the 10% significance level. Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country; ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Generosity is donation net of income effect.
In Table 4 we estimate the same models as in Table 3 , but this time our sample includes only immigrants following Equation (2). The results in Table 4 are largely consistent with those in Table 3 , assuring us that the results in Table 3 are not materially affected by the inclusion of the much larger non-immigrant population. For migrants, and equally for the 11 total population, higher education is a strong positive predictor of an individual's trust in others 8 , while the log of household income has no effect. Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country; ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Across our whole global sample, those who have migrated from countries of lower trust to places of higher trust are about 20% more numerous than those who have moved from higher-trust to lower-trust countries (3,588 vs. 3,076), as shown in Table 5 . In that table we estimate our base model separately for these two groups of migrants. Since including other variables makes only a small difference to the coefficients on current-country and birth-country trust 9 , we use the simpler model in Table 5 to provide larger sample size. Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country; ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
The sum of coefficients on birth-country and current-country trust is higher in model (1) than in model (2) of Table 5 . This is because the model (1) sample, covering those moving to higher-trust countries, has been selected to include those for whom currentcountry trust is higher than birth-country trust. The coefficients on both home-country trust and birth-country trust are higher for immigrants who have moved from a lowertrust to a higher-trust country. The footprint effect of birth-country trust is higher, in both absolute and relative terms, for those who have come from lower-trust countries of birth, and tests show the difference to be significant at the 5% level. This indicates that people from low-trust environments remain largely affected by the low trust in their country of origin even after migration. There is asymmetry, however, as people from high-trust environments are less likely to bring the high trust from the country of origin to the 9 As can be seen by comparing columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 .
13 current country of residence. These contrasting results together may suggest that social trust is harder to build than to destroy.
Generosity: Evidence of Footprints for Prosocial Behaviour
Since generosity and social trust are both important social norms, they are both likely to be learned in youth and possibly relearned when times change or people migrate to a new and different society. Thus we might expect that the migration footprint effects we find for social trust have some echo in the data for generosity. The Gallup World Poll asks respondents if they have given to a charity in the past 30 days. International averages vary a lot, from below 10% in 15 countries to over two-thirds in eight countries. Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country; ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
When people move from one country to another, is their generosity in their new countries, by this measure, determined by the social norms where they now live, or is it also determined in part by the prevalence of generosity in their countries of origin? Table  6 estimates Equation (2) using only immigrants, showing that migrants tend to adapt pretty fully to the norms of generosity in their new countries. However, as we expected, there is for all migrants taken together a significant footprint effect from the norms in their countries of origin. The footprint effect is about half as large as we found for social trust, and is concentrated in migrants to the OECD countries, who represent about a quarter of the total sample of global migrants 10 .
Trust in National and Local Institutions: Experience trumps Culture
In this section we estimate the same model as in column (1) of Table 6 for various measures of institutional trust, to see if there is any footprint effect. Our main presumption is that the footprint from confidence in the same institutions in their birth country will be much smaller than was the case for social trust, and may well not exist. This is because institutions are more readily seen to differ among countries than is human nature. Social trust assessments are more likely to depend on judgements about human nature, while assessments about local institutions are likely to depend on their features more than on those of the same institutions in the immigrant's country of birth. Our results in Table 7 support this presumption, as they consistently show strong effects from the current country but no footprint from similar judgments in the source country.
There may be other reasons, beyond a footprint effect, for immigrants and others to value institutions differently. For example, Maxwell (2010) finds evidence among migrants to Europe that confidence in political institutions is higher among first-generation immigrants than among the native-born, a result he attributes to optimism due to their choice to move to the new environment in hopes of improving their lives (de la Garza et al 1996) . There is some evidence of such an effect in our global sample. On average, immigrants are slightly more likely to trust all local institutions than are the native-born. When we allow for differing immigration shares, and compare immigrant' trust 15 assessments with the native-born in the same country, immigrants remain more trusting than the native-born for trust in the judicial system and trust in the national government 11 . Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country; ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Other demographic variables such as age, age squared, gender, married or in a common-law relationship, separated, divorced, or widowed, and wave dummies are included in all models but not shown in this table.
Conclusions
Data from large samples of migrant and non-migrant respondents to the Gallup World Poll have permitted us to establish some fairly general conclusions about the links between immigration and social norms. First, we have generalized earlier findings that migrants tend to make social trust assessments that mainly reflect conditions in the country where they now live, but nonetheless show a significant footprint effect from their countries of origin. For our sample of migrants to 132 different countries, the average size of the footprint effect is about one-third that of the effect of local conditions.
We also found that the footprint effect seems to be smaller for those who move from higher-trust to lower-trust nations, suggesting that social trust may be harder to create than to destroy.
Second, we found that for our global sample of migrants and non-migrants, their average levels of social trust are the same, after adjusting for footprint effects and each individual's own personal trust-supporting circumstances.
Third, we found that the altruistic behaviour of migrants, as measured by the frequency of their donations in their new countries, is strongly determined by social norms in their new countries, but also has significant footprint effects from their countries of origin. These results are the first to investigate footprint effects for the altruistic behaviour of immigrants.
Finally, we found, as expected, that confidence in local institutions of several types is influenced by the quality of these institutions (as measured by the assessments of others) and not at all by the quality of the same institutions in their countries of origin.
Our results appear to us to be mutually consistent. Taken together, they support the notion that social norms are deeply rooted in long-standing cultures yet are nonetheless subject to adaptation when there are major changes in the surrounding circumstances and environment. Migration provides a strong test, as it takes individuals brought up in one culture and transfers them to another. Although migrants tend to associate in their new countries with others from the same source country, we find nonetheless that two important social norms, as represented by social trust and generosity, adapt substantially to the prevailing norms in their new countries of residence. Nonetheless, the continuing importance of cultural and social norms established in earlier life is demonstrated by the significant footprint effects that we find for both social trust and generosity.
Our results showing no footprint effects for confidence in specific institutional features of immigrants' new countries confirm that our previous footprint results are not simply evidence that people are slow to absorb the features of their new environment. When asked specific questions about the institutional features of their new countries, immigrants' answers reflect the characteristics of those institutions, with no footprint from the quality of the institutions in their countries of birth. Thus the footprint results for trust and generosity have strong claims to reflect broader social norms, just as we and others have argued.
